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§ 1.1. Fiduciary Duty- Minority Shareholders in Closely Held Corpo-
rations.* Recent Massachusetts decisions, which redefined the duty majori-
ty shareholders owe to minority shareholders in closely held corporations, 
have dramatically altered the nature of corporate fiduciary law . 1 In a lead-
ing decision, Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.,Z the Supreme Judicial 
Court held that shareholders in close corporations owe one another sub-
stantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that 
partners owe to one another: one of "utmost good faith and loyalty." 3 In 
discharging their management and ownership responsibilities, the share-
holders must adhere to this strict good faith standard of duty and "may not 
act out of avarice, expediency or self-interest in derogation of their duty of 
loyalty to the other stockholders and to the corporation."• Since Donahue, 
the Massachusetts courts have continued to recognize the fiduciary duty of 
majority shareholders in close corporations. 5 An important consideration in 
both Donahue and the subsequent decisions, which imposed a strict stand-
ard of fiduciary duty upon majority shareholders, was the ability of these 
shareholders to manipulate corporate decisions. Such power could be used 
* By Janet Claire Corcoran, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETI'S LAW. 
§ 2.1. ' See Pupecki v. James Madison Corp., 376 Mass. 212, 383 N.E.2d 1030 (1978); 
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976); Donahue v. 
Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975); Drury v. Abdallah, 1980 Mass. 
App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 482,401 N.E.2d 154; Hallahan v. Haltom Corp., 7 Mass. App. Ct. 68, 385 
N.E.2d 1033 (1977). 
For a detailed discussion and commentary on the Donahue decision, see generally Elefante, 
Corporations, 1975 ANN. SURV. MASs. LAW, §§ 17.1, 17.2, at 455-76; Recent Developments, 
Shareholders' Right of Equal Opportunity to Participate in Corporate Purchase of its own 
Stock for Corporate Treasury, 61 CoRNELL L. REv. 986 (1976); Recent Cases, Stockholders' 
Duty of "Utmost Good Faith and Loyalty" Requires Controlling Shareholder Selling a Close 
Corporation its own Shares to Purchase a Ratable Number of Shares from Minority, 89 HARv. 
L. REv. 423 (1975); Rights of Minority Stockholders, 60 MASS. L. Q. 318 (1975); Recent 
Developments, Shareholders in a Close Corporation Owe to One Another Substantially the 
Same Fiduciary Duty Owed by Partners To One Another, 21 VILL. L. REv. 307 (1976). 
' 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975). 
' ld. at 593, 328 N.E.2d at 515 . 
• ld. 
' See supra note 1. 
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to the disadvantage of minority holders, who lack adequate remedies to 
protect themselves from such abuses. 6 
The Donahue court, however, did not limit the application of its holding 
to majority shareholders. The court explicitly acknowledged that in the 
close corporation setting "the minority may do equal damage through un-
scrupulous and improper 'sharp dealings' with an unsuspecting majority.'' 7 
During the Survey year, in Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 8 the Appeals 
Court of Massachusetts considered whether the Donahue strict standard of 
fiduciary duty should be extended to minority shareholders of a close 
corporation. In Smith, the court was called upon to review a Superior Court 
decision which held that a minority shareholder had committed a breach of 
his fiduciary duty to the other shareholders in exercising a veto power over 
corporate action on dividends. 9 In affirming the judgment of the Superior 
Court, the appeals court held that a minority shareholder in possession of a 
veto power becomes an "ad hoc controlling interest" and, as such, owes to 
the other shareholders a fiduciary duty in the exercise of that power. 10 
The significance of the appeals court decision is two-fold. First, the Smith 
decision broadens the applicability of the Donahue standard of fiduciary 
duty to any shareholder of a close corporation in a position to control cor-
porate action. 11 Second, in determining whether a minority ~hareholder's 
exercise of control constitutes a violation of his fiduciary duty, the court 
adopted an approach which considers both the shareholder's fiduciary obli-
gations and his right to exercise a veto power agreed to by the other share-
holders.t2 
• "The corporate form . . . supplies an opportunity for the majority stockholders to op-
press or disadvantage minority stockholders. The minority is vulnerable to a variety of op-
pressive devices, termed 'freeze-outs,' which the majority may employ. . . . In particular, the 
power of the board of directors, controlled by the majority, to declare or withhold dividends 
and to deny the minority employment is easily converted to a device to disadvantage minority 
stockholders." Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. at S89, 328 N.E.2d at S13. 
' /d. at S93 n.lS, 328 N.E.2d at SIS n.17. 
' 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1320, 422 N.E.2d 798, appeal denied, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
2084 . 
• /d. 
10 Id. at 132S-26, 422 N.E.2d at 802. 
11 /d. It is unclear, however, from the decision, under what circumstances a minority share-
holder becomes an "ad hoc controlling interest." The appeals court, in a footnote, id. at 1327 
n.9, 422 N .E.2d at 802-03 n.9, refers to Hetherington, The Minority's Duty of Loyalty in Close 
Corporations, 1972 DUKE L.J. 921, [hereinafter cited as Hetherington) as a helpful discussion 
of the fiduciary obligations of a minority shareholder "in a position to control corporate ac-
tion." Presumably, the determination of when a minority shareholder becomes a controlling 
interest depends upon the facts of each case. 
12 In Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., the appeals court adopted the Wilkes "legitimate 
business purpose" test for determining whether a shareholder has committed a breach of fidu-
ciary duty. 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1327,422 N.E.2d at 802. See Wilkes v. Springside 
2
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1981 [1981], Art. 5
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1981/iss1/5
§ 2.1 CORPORATIONS 43 
The dispute in Smith centered on the disposition .9f the earnings of a close 
corporation which owned and managed real estate. 13 In December of 1951, 
Doctor Louis E. Wolfson agreed to purchase land and buildings which sub-
sequently became the corporation's assets. 14 Wolfson offered 25 percent in-
terests in the real estate to Paul T. Smith, Abraham Zimble, and William 
Burke. 15 Smith, an attorney, performed the legal work necessary to form 
the corporation, Atlantic Properties, Inc. (Atlantic). 16 Upon Wolfson's re-
quest, 17 a provision was included in the articles of organization and by-laws 
which, in effect, gave to each of the four shareholders an absolute veto over 
major corporate decisions. 18 
Disagreement soon arose between Wolfson and the other shareholders, as 
a group, over the disposition of Atlantic's earnings. 19 Wolfson desired to 
Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976). Under that approach, the validity 
of the exercise of control by a shareholder is determined by the purposes for which that power 
is employed. The burden is placed upon the controlling shareholders to demonstrate a legiti-
mate business purpose for the actions complained of by other shareholders. Judicial interven-
tion is appropriate only when the controlling shareholders fail to demonstrate a legitimate busi-
ness purpose, or, where one is asserted and the other shareholders establish that it could have 
been achieved by a less harmful course of action. /d. at 851-52, 353 N.E.2d at 663. See Ele-
fante, Corporations, 1976 ANN. SURv. MASs. LAW,§ 9.1, at 264-71. 
" 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1321, 422 N.E.2d at 800. 
" /d. at 1321, 422 N.E.2d at 799. 
" /d. Each paid Wolfson $12,500, 25 percent of the down payment. !d. 
16 /d. Wolfson, Zimble, Burke and Smith were the incorporators and also became the direc-
tors of Atlantic. Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., Equity No. 86596, at 2 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Suffolk, April24, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Trial Court decision]. Wolfson was named Pres!-
dent; Zimble was named Treasurer; Smith was named Clerk. /d. After incorporating, Atlantic 
purchased the land and buildings. /d. 
Note, the findings of the trial court were adopted in full by the appeals court. 1981 Mass. 
App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1323, 422 N.E.2d at 800. 
17 Wolfson testified that he requested inclusion of the veto provision: "in case the people, 
the other shareholders whom I knew, but not very well, ganged up on me." 1981 Mass. App. 
Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1326, 422 N.E.2d at 802. 
" The veto provision included in the Articles of Organization and By-Laws of Atlantic 
Properties, Inc. which provided: 
No election, appointment or resolution by the Stockholders and no election, appoint-
ment, resolution, purchase, sale, lease, contract, contribution, compensation, pro-
ceeding or act by the Board of Directors or by any officer or officers shall be valid or 
binding upon the corporation until effected, passed, approved, or ratified by an affirm-
ative vote of eighty (800Jo) percent of the capital stock issued outstanding and entitled to 
vote. 
/d. at 1321, 422 N.E.2d at 799. 
Since Atlantic had four shareholders each with a 25 percent interest, the veto provision 
amounted to a requirement of unanimous shareholder approval of all shareholder and director 
actions. 
" Trial Court decision, supra note 16, at 4-5. After its first year of operation, Atlantic 
began to show profits. /d. at 3. 
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devote the earnings to repair and upgrading of the corporation's buildings, 
although his plans for doing so were vague and indefinite. 20 During the 
period from 19S1 to 1964, he consistently refused to vote for any 
dividends, 21 despite warnings from the other shareholders that failure to 
declare dividends might result in the imposition of a penalty tax by the In-
ternal Revenue Service (IRS) for an unreasonable accumulation of earn-
ings.22 The other shareholders considered Wolfson's ideas unnecessary and 
unrealistic, and unanimously desired the declaration of dividends. 23 They 
did agree, however, to make the most urgent repairs. 24 
Since neither faction could force its will on the other, the corporation 
steadily increased its earned surplus. 25 The fears of the other shareholders 
were realized in 1966, when the IRS imposed penalty taxes upon Atlantic26 
for excess accumulations in 1962, 1963, and 1964. Although Wolfson set-
tled the case, 27 he continued his opposition to declaring dividends. 28 Pre-
The court found that an additional cause of disagreement and ill will among the shareholders 
may have been the refusal of the other shareholders to consent to Wolfson's transferring his 
shares in Atlantic to a charitable foundation. Id. The other shareholders were opposed to deal-
ing with a trustee of a charitable organization, who would have the authority to exercise Wolf-
son's veto power. /d. The directors, including Wolfson, adopted a provision to restrict the 
transfer of shares by giving the corporation the right of first refusal as to any shares to be sold. 
/d. Wolfson's subsequent requests to transfer his shares to the foundation were rejected. /d. 
20 /d. at 11. The court found that Wolfson "never attempted to develop any specific, com-
prehensive, and feasible plan for repairs and improvements for the other stockholders to con-
sider." /d. at 10. 
21 Id. at 4, 5. 
22 Smith also stated that if the tax were imposed as a result of Atlantic's failure to declare 
dividends, he would seek to hold those shareholders who voted against a declaration of 
dividends personally respo1,1sible for the amount of the tax. Id. at 6. 
Section 532 of the Intermt~Revenue Code provides that a tax is imposed on the accumulated 
taxable income of every corporation "formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the in-
come tax with respect to its shareholders . . . by permitting earnings and profits to accumu-
late instead of being divided or distributed." I.R.C. § 532. See generally id. §§ 531-37. 
" Trial Court decision, supra note 16, at 5. 
24 Between 1958 and 1961, the other shareholders voted in favor of repairing various roads, 
pumps and smokestacks, having new roofs put on several buildings, and investigating the cost 
and feasibility of repairing or renovating portions of the property. Id. at 6 . 
., Cathcart, Accumulated Earnings Tax: A Trap for the Wary, 62 A.B.A. J. 1197, 1198 
(1976). Atlantic's current assets ranged from seven to nineteen times its current liabilities. Trial 
Court decision, supra note 16, at 6. 
By 1961, Atlantic had approximately $172,000 in retained earnings, of which approximately 
$92,000 was in cash. Trial Court 4ecision, supra note 16, at 3-4. 
26 Trial Court decision, supra note 16, at 8. 
27 Id. The amount of the settlement was $11,767.71 in taxes and interest. /d. Wolfson had 
settled the case without the prior approval of the other shareholders. /d. They ratified the set-
tlement, without prejudice to any right of action they might have had against Wolfson for 
causing the assessment by failing to vote in favor of declaring dividends. Id. 
" /d. at 9. Since its organization, the corporation paid dividends only twice, once in 1964 
and once in 1970. Each dividend totalled $10,000. /d. at 4. Salaries totalling $25,000 were paid 
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dictably, in 1970, the IRS imposed further penalty taxes on Atlantic for the 
taxable years 1965 through 1968. 29 These taxes were upheld by the United 
States Tax Court, 30 which found that tax avoidance was a factor in Wolf-
son's refusal to vote for the declaration of sufficient funds to avoid the 
penalty. 31 
In 1967, the majority shareholders initiated a proceeding in the Superior 
Court of Massachusetts, seeking: (1) a determination of the dividends to be 
paid by Atlantic; (2) the removal of Wolfson as a director, and (3) an order 
that Atlantic be reimbursed by him for the penalty taxes and related ex-
penses incurred. 32 In Smith, the trial court found that Wolfson's refusal to 
vote in favor of dividends was caused more by a desire to avoid taxes and a 
dislike for the other shareholders than by any genuine desire to undertake a 
program for improving Atlantic's property. 33 Concluding that Wolfson 
"acted in bad faith and abused his discretion," 34 the trial court held that he 
committed a breach of his fiduciary duties as a director and as a sharehold-
er. 3 ' In reaching its conclusion that Wolfson stood in a fiduciary relation-
to the directors in 1959 and 1960. ld. No other payments were made to the shareholders. /d. 
" /d. at 10. 
•• Atlantic Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 644, 660-61 (1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 
1233, 1236 (1st Cir. 1975). Atlantic brought suit in the Tax Court challenging the Commission-
er's determination of deficiencies against it. 62 T .C. at 644. The Tax Court held that Atlantic 
was subject to the accumulated earnings tax, id. at 660-61, as it failed to establish a reasonable 
need to accumulate its earnings and profits in the years in controversy, and lacked any specific, 
definite and feasible plans for use of the accumulations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.537-1 (b)(1) (1980). 
" Atlantic Properties, Inc., 62 T.C. at 660. In an attempt to refute the presumption that its 
accumulation of earnings and profits was for the purpose of avoiding the income tax, the cor-
poration argued that the history of deadlock precluded the distribution of dividends. The Tax 
Court acknowledged the deadlock, but held that while those shareholders who acted in good 
faith and consistently voted in favor of dividends were absolved of any tax avoidance motive, 
id. at 659, the finding of a tax avoidance motive on Wolfson's part was enough to place liabili-
ty on the corporation. ld. at 660-61. 
" Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., Equity No. 86596 (Mass. Super. Ct. Suffolk, April24, 
1979). The proceeding was later supplemented to reflect developments after the filing of the 
original complaint. 
" /d. at 9. This conclusion was supported by the findings that from 1951 to 1968, Wolfson's 
gross income and taxable income were significantly greater than the incomes of the other share-
holders. Thus, he had less need for the dividends to insure his own economic well-being. /d. 
Also, since he was in a higher tax bracket, Wolfson derived the greatest tax advantage by 
avoiding additional income from dividends. /d. 
The court also found that Wolfson never attempted to develop any specific, comprehensive, 
and feasible plan for repairs and improvements for the other shareholders to consider. /d. at 
10. 
" /d. at 15. 
" /d. at 16. In Massachusetts, directors must adhere to a "good faith and inherent fairness" 
standard of conduct in discharging their corporate responsibilities. See, e.g., Durfee v. Durfee 
and Canning, Inc., 323 Mass. 187, 196, 80 N.E.2d 522, 527 (1948); Sagalyn v. Meekins, 
Packard and Wheat, Inc., 290 Mass. 434, 438, 195 N.E. 769, 771 (1935); Elliott v. Baker, 194 
5
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ship to the other shareholders, the court relied exclusively on the broad 
language of the Donahue decision. 36 The court determined .that Wolfson 
was individually liable to Atlantic for over $47,000 in taxes and interest, and 
ordered the directors to declare a reasonable dividend. 37 Both parties ap-
pealed from the judgment. 31 
In an unanimous decision, the appeals court affirmed the decision of the 
trial court and applied a strict standard of fiduciary duty to minority share-
holders of a close corporation." In determining that imposition of this 
standard was appropriate, the appeals court stressed that Wolfson was able 
to exercise a veto concerning corporate action on dividend$. 40 The court 
found that Atlantic's veto provision had "substantially the effect of revers-
ing the usual roles of the majority and minority shareholders. The minority 
... becomes an ad hoc controlling interest." 41 The court then considered 
the extent to which a minority shareholder may exercise that control 
without a violation of his fiduciary duty. 42 In reaching its determination 
that Wolfson had breached that duty, the court adopted an approach previ-
ously employed by the Massachusetts courts to settle disputes involving 
alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by majority shareholders of close cor-
Mass. SIS, 523, 80 N.E. 450, 452 (1907). 
" Trial Court decision, supra note 16, at lS-16, where the court states: "A$ a stockholder in 
a close corporation, Wolfson owed to the other stockholders a duty of utmost good faith and 
loyalty. Donahue noted that this duty is more stringent than the fiduciary duty owed by direc-
tors or shareholders to the corporation. Therefore, since this Court has found that Wolfson, as 
a director, has breached his fiduciary duty to the corporation, Wolfson as a shareholder clearly 
has breached his duty of utmost good faith and loyalty to Smith, Burke and the Zimbles," /d. 
at 16 (citations omitted). 
" /d. at 18. 
" After entry of judgment by the trial court, Wolfson and Atlantic filed a motion for a new 
trial and to amend the judge's findings. This motion was denied. Wolfson and Atlantic claimed 
an appeal from the judgment and the former from the denial of the motion. 1981 Mass. App. 
Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1324, 422 N.E.2d at 801. 
" /d. at 1324-31, 422 N.E.2d at 801-04. 
•• Id. at 1325, 422 N.E.2d at 802. 
•• Id. at 1325-26, 422 N.E.2d at 802. While the trial court decision suggested that all share-
holders of close corporations owe one another a fiduciary duty, see note 36 supra, the appeals 
court decision was more narrowly drawn, focusing on the minority shareholder whose conduct 
is controlling on a particular corporate matter. See supra note 11. 
•• 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1326,422 N.E.2d at 802. In commenting on the validity 
of the veto provision under the Massachusetts corporate statute the wurt observed: 
It does not appear to be argued that this 80% provision is not authoriZed by O.L. c. 
1S6B. See especially §S(a). Chapter 1S6B was intended to provide desirable flexibility in 
corporate arrangements. The provision is only one of several methods which have been 
devised to protect minority shareholders in close corporations from being oppressed by 
their coUeaaues and, if the device is used reasonably there may be no, strong public 
policy considerations against its use . . . . The possibilities of shareholder disagree-
ment on policy made the provision seem a sensible precaution. 
/d. (citations omitted). 
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porations. 43 Applying the Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. "legiti-
mate business purpose" test, the court proceeded to examine the business 
interests advanced by Wolfson and the other shareholders as reasons for 
their actions. The court affirmed the trial court's finding that Wolfson 
failed to demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for his refusal to vote 
for the declaration of dividends. 44 In concluding that Wolfson had com-
mitted a breach of his fiduciary duty, the court reasoned that whatever was 
the reason for his refusal to vote in favor of declaring dividends, the risks 
Wolfson ran in subjecting Atlantic to penalty taxes for excess accumulation 
of earnings were unjustified and ''inconsistent with any reasonable interpre-
tation" of his fiduciary duty as a shareholder. 4 ' Thus, the trial court was 
upheld in charging Wolfson with the expenses incurred by Atlantic in the 
tax cases. 46 
The imposition of a strict standard of fiduciary duty upon a controlling 
minority interest in a close corporation is a logical and necessary progres-
sion in the development of corporate fiduciary law in Massachusetts. The 
appeals court's decision is consistent with and supported by the rationale set 
forth in Donahue where majority shareholders, those shareholders typically 
in control of a close corporation, were held to a strict standard. 47 
The corporation in Smith clearly fit the Donahue court's definition of a 
close corporation. 48 Atlantic never had more than five shareholders; all the 
shareholders participated in the management of the corporation; and there 
was no ready market for the corporation's stock. 49 These features of the 
close corporation are linked to the first basic consideration of Donahue that 
because a partnership resembles a close corporation, owners in both forms 
of enterprise have the same fiduciary duties. ' 0 Although Atlantic w.as 
organized in corporate form, its internal features were characteristic of a 
partnership: ownership and management were in the same hands, owner-
ship was limited to the original parties or stock transferees approved by the 
•• /d. at 1327, 422 N .E.2d at 802. See supra note 12 for a discussion of the "legitimate busi-
ness purpose" test. 
•• 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1323, 422 N.E.2d at 800. 
•• /d. at 1328, 422 N.E.2d at 803. 
•• /d., 422 N.E.2d at 803-04. 
47 The rationale in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. for holding majority shareholders to a 
strict standard of fiduciary duty is discussed at 367 Mass. at 586-92, 328 N.E.2d at 512-15. 
•• The Donahue court deemed a close corporation to be typified by (1) a small number of 
stockholders, (2) no ready market for the corporate stock, and (3) substantial majority stock-
holder participation in the management, direction and operation of the corporation. /d. at 586, 
328 N.E.2d at 511. 
•• Trial Court decision, supra note 16, at 15. 
•• Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. at 586, 328 N.E.2d at 512, where the court 
states: "Commentators and courts have noted that the close corporation is often little more 
than an 'incorporated' or 'chartered' partnership." 
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remaining shareholders, 51 and the owners were dependent upon one another 
for the success of the enterprise. 
A related featue of the close corporation which led the Donahue court to 
impose a strict standard of fiduciary duty upon majority shareholders was 
the importance of relationships of trust, confidence and loyalty among the 
shareholders to the successful operation of the corporation. 52 In comment-
ing on this critical connection between shareholder relationships and success 
of the enterprise, the Donahue court noted "disloyalty and self-seeking con-
duct on the part of any stockholder will engender bickering, corporate stale-
mates, and perhaps, efforts to achieve dissolution." 53 Likewise, such share-
holder conduct would be critical to the success of a corporation like Atlan-
tic, where by virtue of a veto provision each shareholder had the 'power to 
control corporate action. 54 As the fate of Atlantic demonstrates, the 
absence or breakdown of relationships of trust, confidence and loyalty 
among the shareholders can result in substantial harm to a close corpora-
tion." Yet, prior to the recognition in Smith of the fiduciary duties of a con-
trolling minority shareholder, there was no assurance that a minority share-
holder would exercise control in a reasonable manner. 
The final, and most important, feature of a close corporation focused on 
by the Donahue court was the inherent danger to minority interests of the 
combination of ownership and management present in a controlling 
group. 56 The court focused on the power controlling shareholders have to 
manipulate corporate decisions to the minority's disadvantage. 57 Of par-
ticular concern to the court was the limited and inadequate remedial options 
available to minority shareholders as protection against such power. 58 For 
example, while .an oppressed minority shareholder can bring suit against the 
majority and its directors, alleging that the directors' conduct constitutes a 
breach of their fiduciary obligations to the corporation, the court recog-
nized that in practice it is difficult for a minority shareholder to successfully 
challenge internal corporate decisionmaking. ' 9 The fiduciary obligations of 
the controlling shareholders who are acting as directors, or through a board 
of directors which they control, run to the corporation and no( to individual 
shareholders. Thus, so long as tlie transaction complained o£ is fair to the 
corporation, a court is unlikely to interfere with the business judgment of 
directors. 
" See supra note 19. 
" Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. at 587, 328 N.E.2d at 512. 
" /d. 
•• See supra note 18. 
" See supra notes 19-31 and accompanying text. 
" Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. at 586-89, 328 N.E.2d at 5ll-13. 
" /d. at 588-89, 328 N.E.2d at 513. 
" /d. at 589-92, 328 N.E.2d at 513-14. 
" /d. at 589-90, 328 N.E.2d at 513-14. 
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In addition to the limited possibility of judicial relief, the Donahue court 
noted it is difficult for a minority shareholder to liquidate his investment as, 
by definition, there is no ready market for shares in a close corporation. 60 
Finally, the court recognized it is unlikely that a minority shareholder will 
be able to take advantage of dissolution as a means of recovering his share 
of the enterprise assets. 61 
Significantly, the appeals court in Smith based its decision to hold a 
minority shareholder to a strict standard of fiduciary duty exclusively on the 
last discussed feature of a close corporation; the ability of a controlling 
shareholder to manipulate corporate decisions to the disadvantage of other 
shareholders and the lack of remedies available to the oppressed share-
holders. 62 In concluding that the majority shareholders could seek protec-
tion from Wolfson, the Smith court reasoned that the veto provision had 
"reversed" the traditional roles of the majority and minority shareholders; 
the minority had become an "ad hoc controlling interest." 63 While the 
nature of the minority's position afforded the minority less opportunity for 
abuse than the position of control typically held by majority shareholders of 
close corporations, such opportunities repeatedly arose for the minority 
shareholder of Atlantic. 64 The appeals court found that the corporation was 
subject to the penalty taxes because of Wolfson's refusal to vote in favor of 
declaring any dividends. 65 The court recognized that the ability of a minor-
ity shareholder to prevent a corporation from taking action can be as detri-
mental to the interests of other shareholders as an unfair affirmative policy 
adopted by controlling majority shareholders. 
The complaining majority shareholders of Atlantic were not, however, as 
lacking in remedies as is the typical minority shareholder of a close corpora-
tion. For example, unlike the complaining shareholder in Donahue, Atlan-
tic's majority shareholders had the options of seeking dissolution of the cor-
poration66 or selling their shares. There are limitations, however, on the 
availability of these options even to the majority. First, while the majority 
shareholders could have authorized the corporation to file a petition for dis-
solution, the trial court concluded that it would be unfair to require them to 
60 Id. at 591, 328 N.E.2d at 514. 
61 /d. at 591-92, 328 N.E.2d at 514. It is difficult for a minority shareholder to comply with 
the terms of the Massachusetts statute. To secure dissolution of a corporation in 
Massachusetts, a petition may be filed when authorized by a majority of the voting stock, or by 
400Jo or more of the voting stock if the directors or shareholders are deadlocked. G.L. c. 156B, 
§ 99. Unless otherwise provided by the articles of incorporation, voluntary dissolution may be 
effected only by a vote of two-thirds of the voting shares. Id. at § 100. 
62 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1325-26, 422 N.E.2d at 301-02. 
6
' /d., 422 N.E.2d at 802 . 
.. See supra notes 19-31 and accompanying text. 
6
' 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1328, 422 N.E.2d at 803. 
66 See supra note 61. 
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seek dissolution as the only means of receiving any profits from the corpo-
ration. 67 Moreover, merely because in some cases oppressed majority share-
holders will have the opportunity to seek dissolution of a close corporation 
should not alter the logical conclusion that when minority shareholders con-
stitute a controlling force in a close corporation, they should be held to the 
same standard of fiduciary duty as majority shareholders. 68 
Second, the sale of their shares was not a feasible option for the majority 
shareholders in Smith. Since Atlantic had a financial history of providing 
little or no return to its shareholders, 69 the majority's holdings were not an 
attractive investment. Furthermore, transfer of the ownership of their 
shares would have been subject to the corporation's right of first refusal. 70 
In effect, the minority shareholders could not have sold their interest in 
Atlantic without first offering it to the corporation, that is, to Wolfson, the 
only remaining shareholder. In light of the limited availability of the op-
tions of dissolution and sale of their shares, the appeals court correctly ig-
nored these options when it reached its determination that the majority 
shareholders were entitled to the court's protection. 
The appeals court was, therefore, correct in concluding that the circum-
stances in Smith required recognition of Wolfson's fiduciary obligations as 
a shareholder to the other shareholders. While the majority shareholders 
were entitled to seek the court's protection, judicial intervention on their 
behalf required the court to strike a balance between Wolfson's fiduciary 
obligations and his right to exercise a veto power granted to him by the 
other shareholders. In reaching its conclusion that Wolfson's exercise of the 
veto was unreasonable and improper, the court turned to the Wilkes ap-
proach for guidance. 71 
The appeals court examined the purposes for which the minority share-
holder allegedly exercised his veto power, as well as the resulting harm to 
the corporation and the majority shareholders, and determined that Wolf-
son breached his fiduciary duty as a shareholder. 72 Wolfson was unable to 
demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for his conduct of refusing to 
vote in favor of declaring dividends. 73 There was ample support for the 
" Trial Court decision, supra note 16, at 18. 
" The availability of the dissolution option to some majority shareholder$ had no impact on 
the appeals court's determination that a minority shareholder in possession of a veto power 
over corporate action should be held to a strict standard of fiduciary dutyi 1981 Mass. App. 
Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1326 n.6, 422 N.E.2d at 802 n.6. 
" See supra note 28. 
•• See supra note 19. 
" 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1327, 422 N.E.2d at 802. 
" /d. at 1328, 422 N.E.2d at 803. 
" The defendants in Wilkes were also unable to demonstrate a legitimate business purpose 
for their actions. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 370 Mass. at 8S2, 3S3 N.E.2d at 663-64. 
In Wilkes, a minority shareholder of a close corporation brought an action against the majori-
10
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court's conclusion that Wolfson had not established a legitimate business 
purpose for his actions. The court found that he failed to submit any com-
prehensive or feasible capital improvement and repair plans to the other 
shareholders74 and did not supply them with necessary information regard-
ing the cost and need for his proposed plans. 7 s Furthermore, Wolfson was 
frequently warned by the others that the IRS would assess penalty taxes 
against the corporation unless it disposed of some of its earnings. 76 Given 
Atlantic's financial well-being, 77 Wolfson could have agreed to vote divi-
dends in an amount adequate to at least reduce the danger of the imposition 
of the penalty tax, without draining Atlantic of the funds needed to finance 
the improvements he desired to make. Thus, in repeatedly refusing to vote 
in favor of declaring dividends, Wolfson's actions were taken with full 
knowledge of the risks to which he was subjecting the corporation. Accord-
ingly, the court concluded that rather than exercising his veto power in fur-
therance of a legitimate business purpose, Wolfson's primary concerns in 
refusing to consent to the declaration of dividends were to avoid personal 
tax liability and to annoy the other shareholders. 78 
By contrast, the court found that the majority shareholders had acted in 
good faith, evincing both a. willingness to vote in favor of necessary im-
provements and a strong desire to declare dividends. 79 While recognizing 
that the majority shared to some extent responsibility for the voting dead-
lock by failing to accept Wolfson's suggestions with much sympathy, 80 the 
ty shareholders, alleging breach of an incorporation agreement and of their fiduciary duty to 
him when they terminated his salary and voted him out as an officer and director of Springside. 
/d. at 843-44, 353 N.E.2d at 659. On appeal of dismissal of Wilkes' action on the merits, the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that the majority shareholders committed a breach of their 
fiduciary duty to Wilkes when they removed him as a director and salaried officer of the cor-
poration. /d. at 851-52, 353 N.E.2d at 663-664. 
The court's conclusion was based on its findings that the majority's action was a "designed 
freeze-out" for which no legitimate business purpose had been advanced. /d., 353 N.E.2d at 
665. 
" Trial Court decision, supra note 16, at 11. 
Once the IRS establishes the unreasonableness of a corporation's accumulation of earnings, 
the burden is on the corporation to refute the presumption that the accumulation was for the 
purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders. I.R.C. § 533. To demon-
strate that the accumulation was for reasonably anticipated business needs, the corporation 
must show that the future needs of the business required such accumulation, and that it had 
specific, definite, and feasible plans for the use of the accumulation. Treas. Reg. § 
1.537-1(b)(1) (1980). 
" Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 31-33. It was the expressed position of the other share-
holders that they would not agree to major capital improvements unless they had such infor-
mation. 
76 Trial Court decision, supra note 16, at 6. 
11 See supra note 25. 
" Trial Court decision, supra note 16, at 11. 
" /d. at 12. 
•• 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1328, 422 N.E.2d at 803. 
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court found that the principal cause of the tax penalty assessments was the 
inaction on dividends caused by Wolfson's exercise of the veto power." 
The appeals court's reliance upon the Wilkes v. Springside Nursing 
Home, Inc. approach suggests that the validity of a minority shareholder's 
exercise of control ought to be determined according to the purpose for 
which he is acting. Where a minority shareholder demonstrates a legitimate 
business purpose for his conduct, absent a showing of bad faith or abuse of 
discretion, the courts should not interfere with the business judgment of 
that shareholder. 12 There are several arguments which support a limited in-
volvement of the courts in the internal disputes of close corporations. 
First, where the organizers of a corporation agree to a veto provision as 
broad as that included in Atlantic's charter, a court should not interfere 
with the reasonable exercise of the veto power by any shareholder. A 
minority shareholder who has "bargained" with his co-shareholders for the 
adoption of such a provision is entitled to exercise the veto to promote his 
views as to what course of action is in the corporation's best interest. 13 
Thus, in a shareholder dispute over the wisdom of a particular corporate 
policy, an ad hoc controlling minority interest is entitled to the same 
deference which a court would show to majority shareholders in establish-
ing the business policy of a close corporation. 84 
A cautious judicial approach to determining when a shareholder has 
breached a fiduciary duty to co-shareholders is the foundation of the Wilkes 
''legitimate business purpose'' test. In Wilkes, the court considered the im-
plications of the Donahue holding for the scope of freedom of action of 
controlling shareholders in close corporations." In particular, in Donahue 
the Supreme Judicial C~urt intimated that the fiduciary duty imposed upon 
majority sharehold~rs governed all their actions relative to the operation of 
the corporation as they affected minority shareholders. 16 The same court in 
" /d. 
" The court is, however, given substantial discretion under the Wilkes test in determining 
whether a shareholder who asserts a legitimate business purpose has still committed a breach of 
fiduciary duty owed to the complaining shareholder. The complaining shareholder is afforded 
an opportunity to demonstrate that the defendant shareholder could have achieved his 
legitimate business purpose through an alternative course of action less harmful to the com-
plaining party's interest. The court is to "weigh the legitimate business purpose, if any, against 
the practicability of a less harmful alternative." Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 
Mass. at 851-52, 353 N.E.2d at 653. See Elefante, Corporations, 1976 ANN. SURv. MASs. LAw, 
§ 9.1, at 268. 
" See Hetherington, supra note 11, at 944. 
" See id., where in commenting on shareholder disputes over the merits of business policy 
the author notes: "the majority is entitled to follow the course it thinks best, despite the most 
earnest disagreement by the minority. He who has the votes makes policy." 
" Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. at 850, 353 N.E.2d at 663. See 
Elefante, Corporations, 1976 ANN. SURv. MASS. LAw,§ 9.1, at 264-271. 
" Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. at 593 n.18, 328 N.E.2d at 515 n.18. 
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Wilkes, however, expressed a concern that ''untempered application of the 
strict good faith standard . . · . will result in the imposition of limitations on 
legitimate action by the controlling group in a close corporation which will 
unduly hamper its effectiveness in managing the corporation in the best in-
terests of all concerned." 17 Accordingly, the court recommended a "bal-
ancing" of the majority's rights to "selfish ownership" in the corporation 
against the concept of their fiduciary obligation to the minority. 18 
These same considerations should guide the courts in evaluating the con-
duct of a controlling minority interest. While a minority shareholder who 
possesses a veto power is in a position to abuse the other shareholders, that 
shareholder is also entitled to a range of discretion to exercise the veto in 
promotion of legitimate business purposes. Judicial reluctance to intervene 
in a policy dispute would not work an injustice upon complaining majority 
shareholders seeking protection from a minority. shareholder. As was noted 
by the court in Smith, having agreed to a broad veto provision at the time of 
incorporation, the majority shareholders knew that they were placing Wolf-
son in a position to exercise the veto to promote policies which he favored 
over the majority's preferences. 89 Wolfson was held to have breached his 
fiduciary duty to the majority because he failed to establish a legitimate 
business purpose for his voting pattern, and not simply because he exercised 
the veto in favor of a business policy opposed by the majority. 90 
An additional reason for a limited role of the courts in settling internal 
corporate disputes is the difficulties which arise following the determination 
that a shareholder has breached his fiduciary duty. Depending upon the 
nature of the conflict between the shareholders, a substantial amount of 
judicial supervision may be required to implement the court order resolving 
the dispute. For example, in Smith the trial judge reserved jurisdiction in 
the Superior Court for five years to allow supervision of the corporation's 
" Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. at 850, 353 N.E.2d at 663. One com-
mentator has characterized the Wilkes decision as "a carefully planned retreat from the rigidity 
of Donahue's strict standard." Gillerman, The Corporate Fiduciary in Massachusetts, 65 
MASS. L. REV. 113, 117 (1980). 
" Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. at 851, 353 N.E.2d at 663, where the 
court recognizes the following as matters in which controlling shareholders should be afforded 
''some room to maneuver in establishing the business policy of the corporation:'' ''in declaring 
or withholding dividends, deciding whether to merge or consolidate, establishing the salaries of 
corporate officers, dismissing directors with or without cause, and hiring and firing corporate 
employees." 
" 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1326 n.8, 422 N.E.2d at 802 n.8, where the court states: 
"The other shareholders, two of whom were attorneys, should have known that it was as open 
to Dr. Wolfson reasonably to exercise the veto provision ... in favor of a policy of reinvest-
ment of earnings in Atlantic's properties . . . as it was from them (possessed of the same veto) 
to use reasonably their voting power in favor of a more generous dividend and salary policy.'' 
•• Trial Court decision, supra note 16, at 9. 
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dividend policy. 91 A similar level of intervention would be required if in set-
tling a dispute a court has to involve itself in the financial management of a 
corporation. 
A final reason supporting a limited involvement of the courts in resolving 
internal corporate disputes is the adverse effect such involvement could 
have on the use and effectiveness of veto provisions as a means of protect-
ing the interests of minority shareholders in close corporations. 92 A veto 
provision is one of several methods which have been devised to protect 
minority interests from oppression by majority shareholders. 93 This ap-
parently was the motivation of the minority shareholder in Smith in re-
questing inclusion of a veto in the corporation's charter. 94 When properly 
drafted, 95 a veto provision is an effective means of affording a minority in-
terest a voice in the management of a close corporation, as well as a form of 
protection against the power traditionally vested in majority shareholders to 
determine corporate policy. 
The abuse of the veto provision and the resulting harm to the corporation 
in Smith suggest that while a broad veto provision may accommodate an in-
dividual shareholder's desire for protection or participation in manage-
ment, that shareholder's needs may be satisfied at the expense of a work-
able, flexible corporate decisionmaking process. In order to retain a work-
able management pattern, an attorney who is asked to draft a veto provi-
sion for a close corporation should consider the following options. 
First, veto provisions increase the chance that a deadlock will occur in a 
corporation's management. The likelihood of deadlock is enhanced if a 
broad, all-encompassing veto power is granted to shareholders. For exam-
ple, in Smith the veto power extended to virtually every significant corpo-
rate action of the directors and the shareholders. 96 Also, a broad veto power 
provides a minority shareholder with more opportunities to use the pow-
er to extort unreasonable and unfair concessions from the other sharehold-
" /d. at 18. The final judgment of the appeals court required Atlantic's directors to confer 
and stipulate as to a general dividend and capital improvements policy for the ensuing three 
fiscal years. If the stipulation was not filed within a specified period, a hearing would be neces-
sary, after which time the court would direct the adoption and carrying out of a policy ade-
quate to minimize the risk of further penalty tax assessments. 
The court could reserve jurisdiction to take the same action for each subsequent fiscal year 
until the parties were able to reach agreement on a program. 
" In Smith, the Appeals Court stated that a veto provision is valid under state law, noting 
that "if the device is used reasonably, there may be no strong public policy considerations 
against its use." 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1326, 422 N.E.2d at 802. 
" See O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 4.01-4.30 (2d ed. 1971 and 
Supp. 1980) [hereinafter cited as O'NEAL] for a comprehensive discussion of veto provisions. 
•• See text and note at note 17 supra. 
" See text and notes at notes 96 to 98 infra. 
" See note 18 supra for the text of the veto provision. 
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ers. 97 Accordingly, it would be prudent for an attorney to restrict the scope 
of a veto power to those areas where it is of particular value to a minority 
shareholder. Commentators have recommended that a veto provision be 
limited to fundamental corporate acts and changes in corporate structure. 91 
Restricting the scope of a veto power to particular corporate decisions 
may, however, still subject a corporation to irreconcilable, and damaging, 
shareholder disputes. Thus, the attorney may wish to consider providing a 
non-judicial means, such as arbitration, for settling those disputes which do 
arise. 99 Arbitration is a recognized method for resolving internal corporate 
disputes and an attractive alternative to litigation. By a provision in the ar-
ticles of incorporation, 100 shareholders can agree that in the event of 
disagreement over certain matters, the manner in which their shares will be 
voted shall be determined by an arbitrator, whose decision will bind all par-
ties.101 While agreements to arbitrate future disputes were not enforceable 
at common law, 102 many states, including Massachusetts, have provided by 
statute that such agreements may be specifically enforced. 103 
Finally, an attorney contemplating use of a veto provision should weigh 
the pros and cons of this device against the features associated with other 
methods of protecting the interests of a minority shareholder in a close cor-
poration. Among the most obvious of these are charter or by-law provisions 
providing for mandatory dividends, •o• and shareholder agreements over 
such matters as dividends, corporate employment, and compensation. 105 As 
the fate of the close corporation in Smith suggests, adopting a broad veto 
97 See PAINTER, CORPORATE AND TAX ASPECTS OF CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS, 338 (2d 
ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as PAINTER] where the author notes: "The broader the veto po~er, 
the greater the possibility that it may be used in a 'power play' rather than for legitimate pur-
poses." 
" See id. at 166-67, 201-02. See also O'NEAL, supra note 93, at§§ 4.10, 4.24. Fundamental 
corporate acts over which the veto power might extend include the issuance of new shares, 
changes in the amount of dividends, corporate repurchase of outstanding shares, and changes 
in employment and compensation of corporate officers and employees. Fundamental changes 
in corporate structure would include changes in the number of directors, amendment of the ar-
ticles or by-laws, merger, consolidation, the sale of assets, dissolution, and the filing of consent 
to a petition in bankruptcy or reorganization. 
•• See PAINTER, supra note 97, at 345-54; O'NEAL, supra note 93, at§§ 9.08-9.25. For a 
discussion of arbitration in the corporate setting see Note, Mandatory Arbitration as a Remedy 
for Intra-Close Corporate Disputes, 56 VA. L. REv. 271 (1970). See also Note, Arbitration as a 
Means of Settling Disputes within Close Corporations, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 267 (1963). 
100 PAINTER, supra note 97, at 351, where the author recommends including the provision in 
the articles so as to bind successors and assigns of the original parties to the agreement. 
101 See, e.g., Ringling Bros. v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1947). 
1• 2 PAINTER, supra note 97, at 346. 
103 G.L. c. 251, § 1. For a list of other states which provide for the enforcement of agree-
ments to arbitrate future disputes, see O'NEAL, supra note 93, § 9.14 n.8. 
104 See O'NEAL, supra note 93, at§ 5.20; PAINTER, supra note 97, at 181-82. 
10
' See O'NEAL, supra note 93, ch. 5. 
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provision as the means of protecting the interest of one shareholder may 
result in substantial, unanticipated harm to the other shareholders and to 
the corporation. 
While Smith itself is an extreme example of the risks associated with 
employing a veto provision as a device for protecting the interests of a 
minority shareholder in a close corporation, the appeals court's decision, 
recognizing the fiduciary obligations of a minority shareholder in a position 
to control corporate action, is relevant to any attorney called upon to draft 
special charter and by-law provisions addressed to the needs of a minority 
shareholder. To the extent that such a provision permits the minority share-
holder to manipulate corporate decisions to the disadvantage of the other 
shareholders, the Smith decision offers a means by which oppressed majori-
ty shareholders may seek judicial intervention on their behalf. Finally, the 
decision may stand as a deterrent to abusive exercise of control by minority 
shareholders. 
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